CEO fraud: acting in the first hours

How the attack unfolds

The attack is prepared. Fraudsters study the org chart, the executive's writing style and the company calendar, often after compromising an internal mailbox. On the day, a pressing message reaches accounting: a confidential transfer must go out immediately, and no one must be told.

The request feels credible because it almost is: right signature, right context, right timing. The demanded urgency and secrecy are what should raise the alarm.

The warning signs

• An urgent, confidential transfer request that bypasses the usual procedures.
• A change of banking details for a supplier or executive communicated by email.
• Unusual hierarchical pressure to skip a dual validation step.
• A slightly altered sender address, or replies that go to a different domain.

The first hours: what we set in motion

From your call, we take over the full response, in the right order:

• Wire recall and freeze request with your bank, with the evidence that makes it actionable.
• Evidence preservation: original emails, technical headers, logs, attack timeline.
• Reports to the Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre and the police, with file numbers recorded.
• Fund tracing and, for transfers sent abroad, mobilization of our partner law firms in the relevant jurisdiction.

Securing the business after the attack

A successful CEO fraud almost always reveals a breach: a compromised mailbox, a payment procedure that can be bypassed, no dual validation. Our parent company Groupe ITCS, a cybersecurity firm based in Montreal, investigates the compromise and fixes what made the attack possible, so it does not happen again.

Your recovery odds, honestly

They depend on reaction time, on where the funds went and on the quality of the case. A transfer reported the same day to a Canadian bank has real chances of being recalled or frozen. A transfer sent abroad a week ago requires other levers, slower and less certain. We will tell you which situation is yours before any commitment.